North Korea's international transactions have grown since the 1990s famine period. Illicit transactions appear to account for a declining share of trade. Direct investment is rising, but the county remains significantly dependent on aid to finance imports. Interdependence with South Korea and China is rising, but the nature of integration with these two partners is very different: China's interaction with North Korea appears to be increasingly on market-oriented terms, while South Korea's involvement has a growing noncommercial or aid component. ese patterns have implications for North Korea's development, the effectiveness of UN sanctions, and its bargaining behavior in nuclear negotiations.
During the 1972 US presidential campaign, "Deepthroat," later revealed to be FBI Associate Director Mark Felt, counseled Washington Post journalists Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein to "follow the money" to unravel the Watergate scandal. is working paper represents a similarly inspired forensic exercise. It seeks to make two contributions to our understanding of North Korea's external economic relations by "following the money."
First considerable uncertainty surrounds the state of the North Korean economy and the country's external sector in particular. Analysts have remarkably little access to conventional economic data, and much of the reported trade and investment data are fragmentary, improperly conceptualized, and subject to gross measurement error (Noland 2001 , Eberstadt 2007 . Simply establishing a factual baseline of the country's external sector, as well pinpointing the sources and magnitudes of uncertainty surrounding these estimates, is a sine qua non for coherent analysis.
Second we are interested in understanding North Korea's external economic relations not simply in their own right, but for the light they shed on the country's diplomacy. Much of the debate about how to deal with North Korea centers on the purported gains from economic "engagement." Yet in the absence of a clear understanding of the changing nature of the country's trade, aid, and investment, it is difficult to judge whether these ties will have salutary consequences or only prolong the country's dependence on international largesse. e core of this working paper is an effort to construct an internally consistent balance of payments for the country, considering licit and illicit merchandise trade, services, current transfers, and capital flows and paying careful attention to the degree of uncertainty surrounding each category of transactions. is exercise is of particular interest because of the relative magnitude that unconventional activities play in North Korea's external relations, particularly weapons exports, drug trafficking, and counterfeiting. A variety of estimates of these activities exist, many well-informed, but these numbers are typically offered in isolation without consideration of their plausibility in light of the overall balance of payments picture. e balance of payments framework offers an approach to assess the plausibility of various public estimates of North Korea's illicit activities; allows us to identify trends in North Korea's external relations and its external financing needs; and provides a convenient indicator of whether the precision of our knowledge about these transactions appears to be rising or falling. e working paper also provides information on the geographic distribution of North Korea's trade, aid, and investment relations. ese changing patterns, including most notably the rising share of China in North Korea's trade and the substantial role played by South Korean aid, have important political implications.
CONSTRUCTING A BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
Constructing a balance of payments for North Korea is a speculative exercise. Even merchandise trade is regarded as a state secret and must be constructed on the basis of "mirror statistics" reported by partner countries (Noland 2000, chapter 3) . Nonetheless, the balance of payments framework, which embodies the accounting identity that every sale is also a purchase, helps assess the likely veracity of a variety of claims about North Korea's economic activities including particularly the magnitude of its illicit ones.
We adopt the conventions embodied in the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Balance of Payments Manual (fifth edition, 1993) . Transactions are divided between those entering in the current account and the capital account. e former encompasses trade in goods and services, income flows, and current transfers (which includes aid and worker remittances). e latter consists largely of financial flows including direct and portfolio investment and changes in official reserves. According to doubleentry accounting conventions, imbalances in the current and capital accounts should precisely offset; they should sum to zero. is result is generally not the case in practice, however, and a final category, the statistical discrepancy (called "errors and omissions" in some contexts) is defined as the residual.
As a roadmap to the discussion that follows, major items in the balance of payments include:
Current Account
• Goods and Services • Financial account (includes direct and portfolio investment)
• Changes in official reserves (includes monetary gold)
Statistical discrepancy
We extend this format to include illicit activities such as counterfeiting which do not appear in conventional balance of payments accounting. We will also make a number of calculations which attempt to separate out transactions occurring on a commercial basis from politically determined transactions, such as aid, to gain insight into the relative magnitudes of these two modalities of exchange. 
Weapons Trade and Illicit Activities
In addition to the trade derived from mirror statistics reported in figure 1, North Korea derives additional revenues from unobserved transactions, which include arms sales that are not technically illegal as well as clearly illicit activities such as drug trafficking and counterfeiting. It may appear obvious that arms sales and illicit activities are nonrecorded activities and should be added to the balance of payments as exports, thus reducing the financing gap. But it is also possible that illicit trade is misreported in other commodity categories and therefore does not represent a dollar-for-dollar addition to North Korea's net exports.
Missiles, for example, could be misreported as fabricated metal products in the importer's statistics.
Public discussion of revenues from these controversial sources has a greater tendency to overstate their contribution (by assuming that they are entirely additional) than understate it (by excessively correcting for the likelihood that they are partly captured elsewhere in the trade data). We return to the issue of "additionality" when reconstructing the overall balance of payments.
Arms
In the 1980s North Korea emerged as a significant player in the global arms market, supplying conventional arms based on Soviet designs including short-range ballistic missiles. 2 According to the 1997 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report, sales in the second half of the 1980s (1986-90) averaged over $500 million a year (in constant 1996 dollars), just less than 20 percent of total exports for that period. North Korea's customers included virtually every major oil exporter, and it sold weapons to both sides during the Iran-Iraq conflict.
1. e timing of this trough corresponds to the Asian financial crisis and a slowdown in Japan, but domestic factors were more significant.
2. In addition to weapons, the North Koreans export a variety of military-related training, consulting, and praetorian guard services (Noland 2000, chapter 3). Arms sales fell in the first half of the 1990s, a victim of shrinking demand and increasingly competitive supply conditions. 3 Nonetheless, there is ample evidence that the North Koreans sought to revive the business in the mid-1990s (for example, Grimmett 2006 (Sanger 2005) . e most likely ongoing customer of large-scale weapons systems such as missiles is Iran (which is also one of several countries in the Middle East that does not report its trade with North Korea to the UN) although Syria is also a probable customer. refer to only a limited number of transactions 3. In the late 1980s, North Korean models began to obsolesce as the Soviets began restricting the transfer of technology and designs. Missile exports were also probably affected by the more general shortage of inputs that followed the collapse of Soviet trade. Following the collapse of the Eastern Bloc Eastern European suppliers stepped up their export activities, generating a glut on the world market for conventional arms. A marked reduction in tensions in a number of regions also limited sales; the end of the Iran-Iraq war was almost certainly consequential in this regard. e declining sales of major weapons systems are no doubt partly offset by provisions of technical assistance packages, the follow-on sale of parts and fuel, and diversification into other military sales, such as patrol boats and ammunition. 9 However, the decline in the sale of large-scale systems would be followed, albeit with a lag, by a decline in the value of associated sales and services as well. Two caveats to this conclusion stem from strategic and demand side considerations. First although a number of North Korea's customers have been peeled away, the interest of a small number of states in acquiring weapons has no doubt grown; Iran and Syria head this list. Second due to the increased price of oil in recent years some of North Korea's historic customers are flush with cash; Iran, again, falls quite clearly in this category, as does Syria, and by extension, their proxy Hezbollah.
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As we will see in considering the geographic distribution of North Korea's trade, economic ties with the Middle East have 8. " roughout the second half of 2003, North Korea continued to export significant ballistic missile-related equipment, components, materials, and technical expertise to the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. Pyongyang attached high priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related technology. Exports of ballistic missiles and related technology were one of the North's major sources of hard currency, which supported ongoing missile development and production." Available at the Central Intelligence Agency's website, https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/july_dec2003.htm#14.
9. Lintner (2005, chapter 11 ) has detailed transactions of this sort as well as the role of North Korean companies acting as intermediaries in the purchase and sale of dual-use technologies to a number of Middle Eastern countries.
10. An example of this phenomenon was the April 2007 revelation of a January 2007 deal to resupply Ethiopia with parts for its Soviet-era equipment. e Ethiopian case suggests that despite the PSI, the United States can turn a blind eye to North Korean arms sales when it has a strategic reason to do so. But the Ethiopian case was the exception, not the rule Mazzetti 2007, Lee 2007). 11. e Sudan would be another potential customer combining oil revenues with a need for conventional arms.
ere have also been reports of arms sales to some African countries that would be plausible given North Korea's historical ties to some of these regimes, and the increasing production of oil in Africa that would provide the financial wherewithal for such purchases. grown substantially. Nevertheless, from an overall balance of payments perspective, we suspect the role of arms sales in overall exports to have declined from their high point in the 1980s.
Drugs
North Korea has long been involved in drug trafficking, initially exporting opiates and later synthetics such as methamphetamines. ese activities involved both North Korean diplomats as well as cooperation with international criminal organizations Chesnut 2007) .
12
Sales of drugs, which depend on complex wholesale and retail networks, are even more difficult to track than those of missiles which involve large, discrete transactions. Because these networks involve extraordinary mark-ups as one moves down the distribution chain, estimates of the drug trade are easily inflated by applying street prices to upstream transactions. 13 e difficulty of constructing revenue estimates is further compounded by the fact that the North Koreans are not only involved in the production of drugs, but provide courier services for other producers. 14 A former US government official has put annual drug revenues at $100-200 million . In successive reports for the CRS, has offered a more modest estimate of $71 million a year (broken down into $59 million from opiates and $12 million from amphetamines).
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Some simple calculations of estimated acreage under cultivation, likely output, and wholesale prices lead us to believe that this estimate should be treated as an upper bound. 16 12. Although drugs almost certainly dominate North Korea's smuggling activity, there is evidence-in the form of diplomatic expulsions-for trade in other sanctioned items, including so-called "conflict" diamonds from civil war zones in Africa, rhino horns, and ivory Prahar 2006) . North Korea has also been accused of committing insurance fraud as well (Nanto and Perl 2007). 13. For example, in the same congressional testimony, a US official reported both the purchase of 60 kilos of amphetamines by Japanese crime syndicates for $1 million (or $17,000 a kilo) in 1998 and a Japanese seizure of 565 kilograms in 1999 with a street value of $347 million (or $615,000 a kilo) (Prahar 2006 )! Clearly, the former rather than the latter are closer to what we would consider export prices.
14. is business was brought to light in dramatic fashion in 2003 with the seizure of a North Korean freighter, the Pong Su, off the Australian coast carrying 125 kilos of heroin, probably of Southeast Asian origin.
15. As with missiles estimates, the drug trade's value has sometimes veered into the fanciful, including the estimate from an American military official in 2003 that the North Koreans were earning between $500 million and $1 billion a year from trade in narcotics at a time when total exports for the whole country were only $775 million (Solomon and Dean 2003) .
16. According to Perl (2005, 9) , the State Department's 2000 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report estimated the area under opium cultivation in North Korea at 4,200 to 7,000 hectares in 1998, which would yield 30 to 44 metric tons of opium, or 4.6 to 6.8 metric tons of heroin at a conversion rate of 6.5 to 1. In 2004, according to the 2005 World Drug Report (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2005, 46) , the farmgate price of opium ranged from a low of $142 a kilo (in Afghanistan) to $234 a kilo (in Myanmar). If we take the generous estimate of $200 a kilo, this would yield a total farmgate value for opium production of only $6-9 million. On the other hand, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2003, 247) (Asher 2006, Nanto and . However, the decline in seizures could also reflect more effective surveillance and interdiction of North Korea's activities. 17 We believe the $70 million figure offered by the CRS should be treated as an upper bound estimate, with one-quarter to half of that estimate as a more probable figure for 2005-06.
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Counterfeiting
A second major form of illicit activity is counterfeiting. US government officials had long suspected North Korea to be the origin of the so-called "supernotes," very high-quality counterfeits of $100 bills, which began to appear in 1989. 19 However, the issue gained more attention in 2005 with a series of million, assuming the North Koreans were able to get this wholesale price on all output. Yet prices of heroin on other markets have undergone a sharp decline-as much as 50 percent in wholesale prices-following the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the resurgence of production in that country.
17. In 2006 Japanese police successfully broke up the ring that was responsible for seven, high-profile seizures in that country in the late-1990s and early 2000s. In 2004 the Chinese Ministry of Public Security publicly stated its concern with North Korean drug smuggling and has also recently prosecuted a number of North Korean traffickers, albeit small-scale ones. ese drug-related actions are in addition to the more general scrutiny to which North Korean trade is now subject since the onset of the crisis, and of the missile and nuclear tests in particular. According to Raphael Perl, there 18. Moreover both official and unofficial reports out of North Korea suggest that the regime itself has begun to show signs of concern over drug trafficking, either because of external pressure on the issue or more likely because of the penetration of drugs into domestic use (International Narcotics Control Board 2005, 68) .
19. Due to macroeconomic instability and the declining value of the North Korean won, the North Korean government may also print counterfeits to capture seignorage internally, and some of these notes may simply leak out through North Korea's cash-based external transactions.
criminal cases and Treasury enforcement actions against a Macau bank, Banco Delta Asia (BDA).
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Concern over the laundering of counterfeit notes was also behind the Treasury Department finding that BDA was a financial institution of "primary money laundering concern," an action that As with other illicit activities, estimating returns from counterfeiting is difficult. In the second half of the 1990s-before the recent emphasis placed on North Korea's illicit activities-South Korea estimated total counterfeiting revenues at $15 million, but US officials believed this number was too high (Noland 2000, 121) . Since that time, US government officials have estimated that $50 million of notes have been seized since 1990 and that the total amount of counterfeiting is very much larger than that, even in the hundreds of millions of dollars (Hall 2007) . According to North Korea may earn as much as 40 percent of the face value of all notes counterfeited. If one simply allocated the $50 million in seizures over the 16-year period, applied the 60 percent discount, and assumed that a dollar was seized for every one successfully passed it would imply revenues of $1.25 million per year. Seizures are only some fraction of the total stock of notes in circulation, and this estimate would constitute a lower bound for currency counterfeiting revenues.
ere are reasons to believe that income from counterfeiting is in retreat, however, and indeed may have been exaggerated from the start. e Treasury Department has stuck closely to its claims about BDA, and even finalized its initial ruling against the bank in March 2007. But the underlying evidence has been held secret. Although an Ernst and Young audit conducted for the Macau monetary authorities indicates that internal controls were weak, numerous press reports claim that counterfeiting through BDA was overstated and that the motive for targeting the bank was to restrict North Korea's gold sales or simply to generate a political bargaining chip. Fearing ensnarement in future money laundering cases, major banks have since shunned North Korea, impeding its ability to conduct even legitimate commercial 20. As with drug smuggling, the sale of supernotes involves a complex distribution chain in which notes are sold wholesale to distributors at some discount to their face value. A 2005 US indictment documented the alleged distribution of $28 million in notes in six European countries, while two US sting operations generated indictments involving $6 million in counterfeit currency (Meyer and Demick 2005; Perl 2006; Chesnut 2007) . 21 . Although it denied wrongdoing, the bank experienced a run on deposits. Under pressure not only from the United States but from correspondent banks in Japan, Korea, and Europe, it severed connections with approximately 50 North Korean individuals or businesses-many believed to be military-related or party-relatedand allowed Macau authorities to administer its operations.
transactions. According to Chesnut (2007) currency counterfeiting incidents dropped to zero in 2006. 22 Counterfeiting has not been limited to currency, however; evidence also exists of North Korean involvement in counterfeiting of cigarettes and pharmaceuticals , Chesnut 2007 . is trend is notable because illicit activities are sometimes connected; cigarette counterfeiting helps to keep smuggling in and out of North Korea viable, and the same boats that move cigarettes allegedly have also moved supernotes and drugs.
As this review shows, there is extraordinarily high variation in the valuation of North Korea's illicit sales. In considering estimates of totals, however, it is important to be cautious. Many estimates make reference to prior periods, or peak levels of the given activity and few make any adjustments at all 
Services Transactions
Little data exist on licit services transactions. For example, North Korea has earned a small amount of foreign exchange by permitting commercial airliners overflight rights to its airspace, and there have been 22 . In 2006 bilateral meetings with the United States, the North Korean delegation indicated they were prepared to subscribe to international norms with respect to money laundering, proposed the establishment of a joint US-North Korean task force on counterfeiting, and even asked the United States to provide technical assistance in identifying counterfeit bills (Kwak 2006, 15) . Resolution of the BDA case was a major North Korean demand in talks held in Berlin prior to the Six Party Talks in February 2007, and United States' willingness to discuss the issue through a separate channel was a key development. Today North Korea receives $72 million annually in rent for Kumgang, plus an additional fee per visitor that has been running between $9 and $14 million a year. ese admissions fees have fallen recently as the destination has lost its luster; North Korean belligerency has soured potential tourists.
North Korea also benefits from hotel stays and additional spending by visitors on sundry items. e South Korean government reports "noncommercial transfers" associated with the project as running in the tens of millions of dollars annually.
Current Transfers
Private Transfers: Workers' Remittances
Workers' remittances are transfers made by workers temporarily abroad (the equivalent transfers by permanent migrants appear in the capital account). In the case of North Korea workers' remittances have been generated in the Soviet Union/Russia, though in recent years North Korea has been replicating the model of organizing contract workers in a much wider array of countries, including Libya, Saudi Arabia, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic. For example, the supply of North Korean labor for work in the Middle East was a provision of Orascom Construction's 2007 investment in a North Korean cement plant (Griggs and Fidler 2007) .
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A distinct form of unrequited transfer originates from the Korean community in Japan and will be discussed in the context of the capital account. North Korea's export of labor to Russia dates to the Soviet era, when prisoners were used in logging compounds that were run entirely by North Korean security forces. In 1995 the North Korean and Russian governments renewed the treaty that had lapsed in 1993 under which North Korea would supply 15,000-20,000 loggers to work off Soviet-era debts. A variety of other North Korean enterprises have subsequently entered the business of providing contract labor in logging and the construction sector in Vladivostok, employing an additional 10,000-15,000 North Koreans (Zabrovskaya 2006). 26 25. Due to human rights concerns over the treatment of North Korean contract workers, the Czech Republic stopped issuing visas for this purpose in 2007.
26. e impact of these workers on North Korea's balance of payments is not straightforward. State-owned companies appear to select workers for three-year contracts, collect and retain all wage payments and pass on only some share-perhaps as little as 10 percent-to the workers themselves. Alternatively contracts may require provides figures on the locational and occupational distribution of North Korean workers in Russia, estimates of their earnings, and repatriated savings. Constructing an annual estimate of these remittances is difficult because most of these jobs (for example logging, construction, and fishing) involve seasonal work. Annualizing her monthly data would yield an estimate of approximately $10 million in remittances. Applying this figure to a roughly equal number of workers thought to be working under official contracts in Russia and elsewhere yields the high end estimate of $20 million. Cutting the best guess estimate in half to account for the seasonal nature of most of this work, and the likelihood that these workers are not employed during the Russian winter yields the lower bound estimate of $5 million.
ere is also a community of North Korean refugees in China that has been estimated as ranging from as few as 20,000 to as many as 400,000 people (Chang, Haggard, and Noland 2006) . A considerable share of these refugees reports returning to North Korea bearing food and money. However, many people in this community are not employed and those who are generally earn low wages. e amounts that they are transferring back to North Korea are small and may well be declining as increased policing has discouraged cross-border movement. However there is an ethnic Korean population on the Chinese side of the border that makes private transfers to North Korea and is a conduit for money originating in Korean communities outside China. is nonrefugee channel is almost surely more important in financial terms than funds emanating from the refugees themselves.
O cial Transfers
Aid
Since the famine of the 1990s North Korea has received nearly $2.5 billion in aid from official and private sources, the overwhelming majority of which has taken the form of in-kind transfers of food and other humanitarian items (table A.3). Despite claims that humanitarian aid should not be linked to politics, aid has become much more erratic since the onset of the nuclear crisis with bilateral assistance from China and South Korea playing a more prominent role. Assessing the magnitude of Chinese support is difficult: It does not participate in multilateral initiatives such as the World Food Program, is not a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Development the contracted worker to earn a certain amount per month, allowing them to keep the remainder; this pattern is visible in the construction sector in Vladivostok. In some cases payments to workers appear to be in-kind or in coupons rather than in cash. Other reports suggest that the contract labor is part of complex barter arrangements in which labor is used to pay for timber or oil; in this case the wage payments would constitute the counterpart of a commercial import. Yet in all of these cases, remittances constitute a potential windfall to the government because of its ability to capture the difference between what firms-effectively the government-are paid and the share of that payment actually reaching the workers.
Assistance Committee, and does not publish figures on its bilateral aid programs. Chinese customs statistics do categorize some transactions as "aid," but these would appear to constitute a lower bound: e figures appear to exclude major transactions in food and fuel carried out at "friendship prices" which embody a grant or concessional element although of unknown magnitude.
It is sometimes argued that China simply allows North Korea to accumulate arrears on its trade account. If this is indeed the case, then Chinese support has been significant: Since the mid-1980s the cumulative trade imbalance has been roughly $7 billion, which could be viewed as the upper bound estimate of support (Haggard and Noland 2007, chapter 6 ). However it is highly doubtful that the entire bilateral deficit represents aid. First there is ample anecdotal evidence that the imbalance is financed in part by other financial flows from China such as foreign direct investment (FDI) and remittances carried through the growing border trade. Second the bilateral deficit could be financed by net export earnings from trade with third countries or financial flows from those countries, including South Korea which has a deficit on its current account with North Korea. Taking these considerations into account, we take the high-end estimate of Chinese aid as the total value of its exports of food and fuel to North Korea.
Other O cial Transfers
In addition to humanitarian and development assistance, North Korea has also been the recipient of various official transfers, including payments by the United States associated with efforts to recover the remains of soldiers missing in action from the Korean War, and more significantly, activities falling under the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). According to the 2004 KEDO annual report, the organization spent nearly $400 million on oil between 1995 and 2002 when deliveries were halted. e KEDO annual reports do not permit us to estimate a precise transfer value of local construction on the reactor project. However, the South Korean government, which had primary responsibility for overseeing construction, reports "noncommercial 27. More than $4 billion was pledged to this effort, principally by the governments of South Korea and Japan. However, the lion's share of KEDO funds were both raised and spent outside of North Korea, for example for the design and procurement of reactor components. From a balance of payments perspective, we are interested solely in what was actually transferred to North Korea. is would appear to consist only of the heavy fuel oil and whatever funds were used for site construction, including payment for workers and shipped construction materials such as cement.
exports" associated with the project, including construction-related materials. ese exports peak at nearly $59 million in 2002. North Korean workers reputedly received $110 in monthly wages; $1 million in annual wages would appear to be a generous estimate of what the North Koreans were receiving. If we add $1 million in wages to the noncommercial exports associated with the project, it probably provides a reasonably accurate estimate of what North Korea received through this channel.
North-South "Cooperation Projects"
A final, and significant, source of current transfers to North Korea is from the South. ese transactions are dominated by direct support, which has mostly taken the form of food aid and provision of fertilizer (table A. 2). Although this support is officially financed by "loans," there can be little doubt that they are in fact aid. However, the aid relationship also encompasses a number of large, highly visible and symbolically significant North-South "cooperation projects" that occupy a grey area between commercial and noncommercial transactions. ese projects have been closely tied to broader foreign policy initiatives; as a result, public-private risk-sharing and outright subsidies were features of them from the beginning. In connection with agreements reached in 1998 and the North-South summit of 2000, Hyundai had promised, and probably made, payments to North Korea of approximately $800 million through 2005; this history is briefly recounted in the appendix.
28
Over time, however, the public component of these projects has actually increased either because of the financial burden they imposed on the private actors (mainly Hyundai Asan) or because the political risks seemed too substantial for firmsand smaller firms in particular-to invest on their own.
In addition to these highly visible large-scale projects, a large number of South Korean nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are involved in North Korean-related projects such as "cultural tourism" and "knowledge partnership" projects have arisen through them. Anecdotally these reconciliation projects are often alleged to have a significant transfer component. Park and Jung (2007) document 91 "knowledge partnership" projects over the period [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] 
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Such deals resemble barter: In principle they should increase both exports and imports by an equivalent amount leaving the net balance unchanged. In reality, give the opacity of pricing and the scope for politicization, these arrangements may become another channel for implicit South Korean aid.
CAPITAL ACCOUNT TRANSACTIONS
North Korea has been effectively excluded from international capital markets since defaulting on bank loans in the late 1970s. Its ability to borrow internationally is limited to a relatively low volume of short-term trade credits that the OECD put at $188 million in 1994. As described in the appendix, the North Korean government received a large and highly controversial one-off transfer from South Korea in connection with the summit meeting. It also receives significant, though declining, unrequited private transfers in the form of migrants' remittances, primarily from ethnic Koreans in Japan. Inflows of FDI, mostly from China but from other sources as well, have almost certainly become a more important component of the overall balance of payments picture. However, there is no consistent data on such flows and indeed the North Korean government appears intent on hiding their extent for fear that the enterprises might be targeted by sanctions.
Capital Transfers: Private Unrequited Transfers
As with other sources of financial support for the country, the magnitude of private unrequited transfers has been the subject of substantial controversy. Estimates dating from the early 1990s of remittances from Japan alone ranged from $10 million a year to a high of $2 billion (Eberstadt 1996; Lind 1997; . e most credible estimates from this period were in the range of $16-41 million and certainly less than $100 million a year. Since then, a string of events has combined to reduce Japanese remittances, 
Investment: FDI
We have seen no credible evidence that North Korea has been able to reestablish its ties to international financial markets. However, there is evidence that the regime has made efforts to attract FDI, and that it has had at least some success in doing so. e increase in FDI reflects in part policy changes taken in response to the growing external constraints we have highlighted in the previous sections, in part an adaptive response on the part of enterprises. enterprises. e onset of the second nuclear crisis did not deter such investment, at least through 2005; the 2002-05 period saw the most sustained inflows into the country since 1990.
THE MODALITIES OF NORTH KOREA'S EXTERNAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS
North Korea's current account credits and debits are shown in figure 2. In addition to our baseline or "best guess" estimates, figure 2 also displays high and low estimates formed by applying the extreme estimates in the reviewed literature. e band defined by the extreme estimates for credits is much larger than for debits: ere is considerable uncertainty about the magnitude of a number of the underlying credit components including the "additionality" of weapons sales, illicit activities, Chinese aid, and workers' remittances. Although North Korea may conceal some weapons-related imports, the scope for illicit debits appears less. e time patterns of these aggregates largely track those of the reported According to the baseline estimate, North Korea ran a current account deficit over the entire sample period (figure 5). However, the divergence of the high and low estimates is such that in only five of the 16 years of the sample is the sign of the balance unambiguous. Two of those observations were the terminal years of the sample: In both 1990 and 2005 the country ran a current account deficit, in both cases probably on the order of $500 million. Keeping in mind that our confidence in the import data is more substantial, the "high" estimate of the current account implies that North Korea ran a current account surplus and exported capital, possibly including reserve accumulation, during the worst of the famine and its immediate aftermath. is implausible result in fact suggests an important finding. Either the upper bound estimates of various nonconventional revenue streams are unlikely to be true, at least jointly, or there are major expenditure items that are missing.
In theory the current account and capital account should sum to zero; any imbalance in transactions in goods and services is exactly offset by a corresponding financial flow (figure 6). In the North Korean case at times this discrepancy has been large (1990 at the onset of its financial crisis and in 1997 at the peak of the famine) and has taken both positive and negative values, the former implying that the country was consuming more resources than can be accounted for by the estimated transactions, i.e., the magnitude of its current account deficit exceeds capital inflows. So for example in 1990 at the onset of its economic crisis when the baseline estimate of the statistical discrepancy reaches nearly $400 million, it is possible that North Korea was financing its imports through a reduction in official reserves which we cannot observe and hence cannot properly record in its capital account transactions. In most years the baseline estimate of the statistical discrepancy takes a negative value, implying that North Korea has unaccounted for resources. Assuming that these estimates are correct, there are a variety of possible explanations, none mutually exclusive. e first explanation is that even our skeptical guesses about unconventional revenues may be generous, and the earnings generated by these activities are even less than our best guesses. A second explanation would be that imports are undercounted. It is possible that North Korea is importing weapons systems that go unreported, or that other items-for example luxury goods-are not accounted for in existing statistics. A third possibility is that the authorities have been accumulating official reserves. Although this is difficult to believe for the famine period, it is certainly possible that the regime saw the resumption of trade and investment in the early 2000s as an opportunity to rebuild foreign exchange holdings.
ere could also be unaccounted for capital outflows. We have assumed that North Korea is not engaged in any substantial FDI of its own, but there is certainly some, such as the establishment of trading companies engaged in labor contracting or North Korean-themed restaurants. More significantly, it is possible that at least the top circles of the North Korean elite have accumulated foreign assets.
Some high-ranking North Korean officials maintain residences in foreign countries and educate their children abroad. e possibility of the proverbial Swiss bank account cannot be ruled out, although the controversy over a mere $24 million in BDA suggests that such overseas investments are not likely to close the statistical discrepancy.
SHIFTING PATTERNS OF ENGAGEMENT
e analysis thus far has addressed aggregate trade and financial flows. A distinct issue of political as well as economic interest is the geographical distribution of these flows. 34. Imports from Russia have also risen steadily over the period, although exports to Russia have not. One explanation for this trend is North Korea's clearing system or the absence of one. Given the collapse of North Korea's internal payments system in the 1990s, the increasing scrutiny of North Korea's external financial transactions, and the aftermath of the BDA case, trade that is not conducted in dollars is probably balanced bilaterally. Imports are financed either through merchandise exports to the country in question or other earnings in that currency. In the case of Russia, North Korea purchased Russian imports with ruble-denominated earnings from contract labor . Similarly North Korea may have cut imports from Japan in part because restrictions on exports and remittances have limited its access to yen. Even before the missile and nuclear tests of 2006, Japan had drifted toward a de facto sanctions policy as well and both trade and remittances had fallen sharply (Hughes 2006) ; these trends became even more pronounced in the second half of 2006 as Japan opted for a near complete embargo following the onset of the nuclear crisis and in response to ongoing conflicts over abductees.
explain South Korean concerns about China's "economic colonization" of the northern part of the peninsula. e picture changes, however, if transactions on commercial terms, and those embodying a concessional or grant element are disaggregated. What is striking is the difference between the deepening integration between North and South Korea depicted in figure 7 , and the relative stagnation of South Korea's role in commercial trade (table 1) . is point is reinforced in figure 8: e magnitude of Chinese transfers, while uncertain, appears to be fairly constant, and since 1999 are dwarfed by South Korea's skyrocketing transfers. e ironic message is that North Korea's deepening economic integration with China is largely market-based, while exchange with South Korea has a growing official component.
Whatever its perceived political utility in the short-run, this particular profile raises serious questions about the transformative effects of South Korea's engagement with the North. 
MENA = Middle East and Northern Africa
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Noncommercial goods
Trade in goods associated with noncommercial inter-Korean projects, humanitarian aid, and officially reported Chinese assistance corresponding to the import of goods are recorded as a subcategory of goods trade, entitled "noncommercial merchandise," which was created for illustrative purposes. 36. is category of import includes North-South cooperation projects, social and cultural cooperation, and other inter-Korean economic cooperation, as well as goods imports from South Korea associated with Kaesong, Mount Kumgang, and the KEDO light-water reactor project. Imports associated with bilateral and multilateral aid, including humanitarian assistance and heavy fuel imports associated with KEDO, are also recorded here.
Box A.1 Discrepancies in trade data between sources and the selection of KOTRA
In this exercise we chose to use data from KOTRA as opposed to other competing sources because we believe it reports the most plausible numbers for North Korea's merchandise trade with the rest of the world. The other sources that were considered were the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) and the United Nations (UN) Commodity
Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). Even a cursory glance reveals signi cant di erences in levels of merchandise trade reported by these sources, and closer inspection shows large discrepancies in levels of recorded bilateral trade on a country by country basis. These discrepancies appear to arise for two reasons. First KOTRA strips aid out of its merchandise trade gures. Second as has been demonstrated in the past national reporting authorities occasionally misidentify trade with South Korea as being with North Korea . Furthermore, the exclusion of certain countries from KOTRA that remain in DOTS and COMTRADE account for some of the discrepancies that we observed.
Where large discrepancies in recorded bilateral trade data exist between KOTRA and DOTS and COMTRADE and where countries are omitted from the KOTRA data, we tend to nd (1) high levels of volatility in year-on-year trade patterns and/or (2) suspect commodity composition of bilateral trade, both of which suggest misreporting. Where high levels of volatility are observed, the median observation is typically a negligible amount of trade and highly suspect increases in trade occur over one or a small number of years, justifying omission. In many cases large jumps in exports or imports correspond to suspect commodity composition, for example when countries report importing large amounts of telecommunications equipment or motor vehicles from North Korea. In sum we believe that KOTRA, which has screened the North Korean trade data for such anomalies and stripped out aid from merchandise imports, is the most plausible source for data on North Korean trade.
in (table A. 2), the import component of which is either direct in the form of in-kind aid or assumed to finance immediately the import of goods. e South Korean share of aid recorded by the UN is stripped out to avoid double counting data that already appears in the KITA data.
Data on officially reported Chinese assistance was obtained from the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP).
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Arms and Illicit Goods e recording of illicit trade includes estimates of trade in arms, drugs, and counterfeited currency and cigarettes. We treat arms trade as possibly unreported or misreported. To compensate the lower range of credits and debits in goods omits arms estimates on the assumption that arms may already be recorded in with commercial trade in goods. Some degree of uncertainty surrounds all of these transactions, and each type of "illicit" transaction is recorded with baseline, high, and low-end estimates.
Arms data draws on data from SIPRI and the US Department of State. Ranged estimates and a best guess are created for years in which data from these two sources overlap. e sale of arms abroad makes up a substantial share of exports of illicit goods in earlier years (table A. 3), 38 and the acquisition of arms from overseas is the only item recorded as an illicit import in our balance of payments exercise. Data taken from SIPRI is recorded in constant 1990 US dollars and was adjusted to current US dollars using World Bank data on the US GDP price deflator. Estimates of revenues from the export of counterfeit currency are derived from and based on the authors' own calculations. More specifically, the authors provide both the high-end and best guess estimates, and the low estimate is derived from Asher. 42 e final category of illicit transaction recorded here involves unrecorded gold exports that were sold to BDA. e authors' calculations were based on underlying data found in Coleman and Lau (2006) .
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Services
Accounting for North Korea's services trade in the balance of payment framework involves only tourism revenues from Mount Kumgang. We do not record any services imports on debit side, although it is likely that some of the imports associated with humanitarian aid and inter-Korean cooperative projects may technically fall under services and be misclassified in with goods. In the absence of more detailed data, however, making this distinction is very difficult if not impossible, and at any rate such imports still find their way into the debit side of the overall current account balance.
Services exports are therefore constituted entirely by two types of transactions: rental payments and fees and spending associated with the Mount Kumgang project. A more detailed examination of the Mount Kumgang project is provided in appendix B.
Income
As with North Korea's external services transactions, the income account consists of very little relative to trade in goods, but unlike the services subaccount, North Korea's income account is continuously in deficit throughout the sample period. On the credit side, we include income from North Korean restaurants operating abroad based on estimates derived from Kim (2007) . On the debit side we record interest paid on debt, which was reported in a National Intelligence Council (NIC) report in 2002.
as $80 million to $160 million per year. Asher notes that the study in which these estimates were derived was conducted over the past four years. 42. e low estimate of $1.25 million per year is derived from , citing the detection of approximately $50 million in counterfeit US currency that was traced North Korea over a sixteen-year period. e estimated market value of this currency was 40 percent or less of its face value. us, the low estimate is calculated as 0.40*$50 million/16 years = $1.25/year. e upper bound estimate of $60 million in annual counterfeit currency revenues is based on a scenario in which $150 million in counterfeit bills is printed per year and is sold at 40 percent of its face value. 46. Zabrovskaya (2006, 100-105) provides data on the locational and occupational distribution of North Korean workers. Annualizing and applying to the entire sample her estimated remittance rate for Khabarovsky Kray workers of one-third of monthly wages, yields a figure just below $10 million. Applying this figure to a roughly equal number of workers thought to be working under official contracts in Russia and elsewhere yields the highend estimate of $20 million. Cutting the best guess estimate in half to account for the seasonal nature of most of this work and the likelihood that these workers are not employed during the Russian winter yields the lower bound estimate of $5 million. In 1993 labor remittances drop to zero because of a lapse in the treaty guaranteeing the supply of laborers from North Korea to Russia.
Capital Account e structure of North Korea's capital account is quite similar to the structure of current transfers recorded on the current account. Both consist of specific types of transfers and remittances, which are distinguished from one another by slight differences in the nature of the transactions themselves; current transfers tend to involve a large set of small, frequent-almost continuous in some cases-transfers that have an immediate effect on North Korea's consumption levels, whereas capital transfers involve the transfer of fixed assets or larger, one-off transfers.
Using the definition above to distinguish between current and capital transfers, we count the 
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Trade credits data was originally recorded in , which was found in an unpublished report by the OECD. For the purposes of this exercise, the trade credits 47. Estimates in were made for 1993 and 1994. For the purposes of the balance of payments exercise, these estimates were extended back to 1990 for both low and high estimates, and forward for low-and 50. According to COMTRADE, Japan exported 500,000 metric tons of rice valued at $1,017 million in 2001. is implies that the reported price of Japanese rice exports for this year was $2034/MT, over 10 times the 12-month average price of 5 percent broken milled white rice of $173/MT for 2001 reported in the IMF Primary Commodity Prices database. Interestingly if we subtract out the $1,017 million of rice imports from the $1169 million of total imports from Japan for 2001 as reported in DOTS, reprice the rice exports based on the average price of milled white rice for 2001, adjust by a factor of 1.1 for cif, and add this number to the difference between the IMF's total North Korean imports from Japan and COMTRADE's Japanese rice exports to North Korea, the value of North Korea's total imports from Japan would be approximately $247 million for 2001, almost equal to the $249 million reported by KOTRA. It should be noted that this exercise is merely for illustrative purposes, and that ultimately it is impossible to tell whether the source of the enormous discrepancy discussed above comes from an exercise such as this, a stripping out of "aid," or some other factor.
A second source of discrepancy between KOTRA and DOTS trade data for North Korea comes from country selection; there are many countries that are included in the DOTS trade series that have been omitted from the KOTRA series. is does not necessarily mean that North Korea's world trade totals as reported by DOTS exceed KOTRA in every year, and indeed, KOTRA reports higher levels of North Korean trade with the rest of the world through most of the early 1990s. But country selection does appear to account for a substantial share of the difference between KOTRA and DOTS trade totals for years in which bilateral trade data is available from both sources.
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Looking at trends in reported trade flows and the commodity composition of trade between North Korea and countries that appear only in DOTS reveals anomalies that in many cases can justify their removal from the trade series.
It may be the case that, for certain countries, customs officials are mixing up North and South Korea in the trade data they ultimately report to the UN. While it is difficult to prove this from the point of view of imports into North Korea, what these countries report as importing from North Korea can be more revealing. According to COMTRADE, Brazil, for example, reports a dramatic increase in imports from North Korea between the mid-1990s up through the present, the composition of which appears to be much like that of South Korea's. Forty-two percent of Brazil's reported imports from [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] are classified as machinery and transport equipment, including office machines, telecommunications equipment, and other electrical machinery. Such a dramatically "spiked" pattern of trade over time as well as the suspect commodity composition of exports may help to explain why bilateral trade data between the North and Brazil appears to have been omitted from the KOTRA series, and explains why we have chosen not to include it in this exercise. Other notable examples of questionable reporting of imports from North Korea include Ghana, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras, all of which report large "spikes" of imports of either telecommunications equipment, household appliances, automobiles, automobile parts, or other types of complex manufactures that track closely the commodity composition of South Korean exports.
Based on these and other similar observations, KOTRA's data on North Korean commercial merchandise trade seems more plausible than the alternatives. is is not to claim that the KOTRA trade data is flawless; it is likely that some countries that should have been included were omitted, and therefore KOTRA's trade data likely understates, to some small degree, North Korea's overall level of trade. It is likely, however, that the North's net trade position in goods is fairly accurate, especially when compared with other more uncertain transactions that we record in the North Korean balance of payments. In determining and analyzing North Korea's external position, KOTRA's data provides the most accurate insights into trade in goods.
51. Currently we have bilateral trade from DOTS for all years in this study (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) but only have a bilateral breakdown of trade data from KOTRA for 2001-04.
